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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN SHEEP'S
CLOTHING: THE PUNITIVE EFFECTS OF
OFAC FREEZING SANCTIONS
VANESSA ORTBLAD*
The post-September 11 th expansions to the asset-freezing power of the
Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), coupled with executive branch
pressure to "show results" in the financial war on terror, has caused the
agency to freeze the assets of several U.S. entities and individuals with as
little evidence as hearsay and newspaper articles. Not surprisingly, in at
least one case the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) later found that
there was no direct link between the blocked entity and terrorist finance.
Furthermore, the government has never successfully prosecuted a frozen
individual or entity for financing terrorism.
While freezing assets is intended to be a preventative measure, the
effects are punitive. The sanctions indefinitely deprive an individual or an
entity of property without meaningful due process and indefinitely label
OFAC's target as a supporter of terrorism. To appeal OFAC's decision to
freeze assets, one must contest the freeze by appealing directly to the
agency, without the right to review the evidence OFAC relied upon to
support its action. In every court case a designee has brought against an
OFAC freezing action, the courts have consistently deferred to OFAC's
decision under the umbrella of deference to agency decisions pursuant to
the Administrative Procedures Act and deference to executive decisions
relating to foreign policy and national security.
Only strengthened congressional oversight can limit OFAC's broad
powers to exercise judicial powers without due process. Congress should
require that OFAC meet a clearly defined minimum evidentiary standard
prior to freezing assets and impose reporting requirements to demonstrate
compliance with this standard. Such oversight would help ensure that
OFAC can continue to freeze assets, a necessary action to block terrorist
J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2009; B.A., University
of Washington, 2002. The author would like to thank her father for his consistently great
advice in writing and in other aspects of life.
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finance transactions, without jeopardizing the civil liberties of individuals
and entities that have no direct link to terrorist activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New
York and Washington D.C. (9/11) was the financial war on terror. On
September 23, 2001, President Bush exercised his authority pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)l to issue
Executive Order 13,2242 in which he declared a national emergency and
drastically expanded his abilities to freeze assets in order to cut off funding
that would support terrorist activity. The Bush Administration used its
expanded powers liberally to achieve quick results in its war on terror.
While it is not uncommon to hear criticism of the United States' war against
terrorism in Afghanistan or Iraq, the United States' financial war on terror
has not received much scrutiny. A lack of oversight in the financial war has
resulted in the government freezing assets of individuals and entities with
minimal supporting evidence, without notice, and without due process.
Prior to 9/11, the IEEPA gave the President authority to designate a
person or entity he considered a national security threat, freeze their assets,
and block transactions between them and U.S. persons.3 Executive Order
13,224 and later the USA PATRIOT Act expanded Presidential powers
such that the executive branch can freeze assets of persons or entities that
supported or otherwise associated with terrorists; the executive branch can
submit classified evidence in camera and ex parte; and the executive branch
can block assets during the pendency of an investigation.4 The effects of
this expansion of power have been unfairly punitive.
This is not to say that freezing assets is not effective against terrorist
funding. This tool can be very effective because it can be quickly deployed
without warning. Furthermore, the administration views asset freezing as a
preventive measure rather than a punitive measure.5 Richard Newcomb,
OFAC's Director, has stated that "[e]conomic sanctions are intended to
deprive the target of the use of its assets and deny the target access to the
U.S. financial system and the benefits of trade, transactions and services
1 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-02 (1977).
2 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001).
3 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-02.
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005); Exec. Order No. 13,224.
5 See Oversight of the Dep't of Treasury Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 27 (2004) (statement of
R. Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury).
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involving U.S. markets."6 Once OFAC freezes an entity's or individual's
assets, they are no longer accessible for use for any purpose, terrorist or
otherwise. In effect, the freezing of assets is immediately punitive to the
designated person, entity, or individual or individuals employed by the
sanctioned entity.
The punitive effects would not be so controversial if every entity or
individual that OFAC sanctioned had demonstrably been shown to be a
terrorist or terrorist entity or to be otherwise intentionally financing a
terrorist group. However, OFAC has frozen the assets of at least one entity
that was later deemed to have no direct link to any terrorist group, a finding
made in a monograph on terrorist financing prepared by the staff of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(hereinafter 9/11 Commission Financing Monograph).7 Furthermore, as of
this writing the United States has failed to convict any of the individuals
targeted in post-9/1 1 freezing actions of actually financing terrorism. On
October 24, 2007, the government's latest criminal prosecution against the
largest Islamic charity in the United States, the Holy Land Foundation,
resulted in a mistrial. Remarkably, the government's goals may not
include winning trials. In response to the Holy Land Foundation trial
outcome, former United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas
Matthew D. Orwig said, "I think the government won when it froze the
assets and shut down the organization." 9 Mr. Orwig may be right about the
irrelevance of a trial verdict because of the difficulty in reversing an OFAC
designation and asset-freeze.
Although a designee may appeal his case by writing to OFAC, he has
no access to the information OFAC has used as a basis for freezing and,
therefore, no ability to rebut this evidence.10 Moreover, if a designee
appeals his case in court, OFAC's actions are afforded extremely high
deference under both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
executive decision-making procedures regarding foreign policy and national
security."1 Furthermore, any evidence the prosecution may have is only
6 Id. at 1.
7 JOHN ROTH ET AL., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES: MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 82 (2004), available at http://www.9-
11 commission.gov/staff statements/9 11_TerrFinMonograph.pdf.
8 Adam Liptak & Leslie Eaton, Financing Mistrial Adds to U.S. Missteps in Terror
Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at A16.
9 Id.
10 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45
(D.D.C. 2005); ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 50.
I1 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 163-64 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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presented ex parte and in camera 12 Any semblance of a fair trial in this
instance appears to be illusory.
What is most troubling about OFAC's power is that it may freeze an
entity's assets with extremely little evidence. OFAC may freeze an entity's
or individual's assets even when the supposed financier is merely under
investigation for potentially financing terrorists.13 When an individual or
entity is under investigation, this means that OFAC does not have enough
evidence to designate an entity or individual as a financier of terrorism.
Nevertheless, OFAC may freeze assets based on suspicion alone.'
4
This Comment will focus on the evidentiary standard OFAC uses in
freezing assets. Although OFAC does not publish its evidentiary standard,
the standard may be inferred through several recent cases. This Comment
will discuss: (1) the implications of using a minimal evidentiary standard in
OFAC's freezing process, through several case studies; (2) the punitive
effects of the freezing process on individuals whose assets have been frozen
or who are collaterally affected; and (3) the effectiveness of the freezing
process as a whole. The Comment argues that OFAC lacks adequate
evidentiary criteria for establishing that an individual or entity should be
sanctioned, and proposes that this failure can be remedied through
implementation by Congress of a clear evidentiary standard and of
reporting requirements.
II. BACKGROUND OF OFAC's STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITY
OFAC is a subdivision of the Treasury Department tasked with
administering and enforcing economic and trade sanctions based on U.S.
foreign policy and national security goals. OFAC directs its activities
against targeted foreign countries, terrorists, international narcotics
traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.' 5 OFAC derives its authority to freeze assets
from general presidential power and specific legislation. 16 IEEPA grants
12 See Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 164 (holding that Holy Land Foundation "ha[d] no
right" to procedures approximating a judicial trial or to review classified information that
OFAC had presented in camera and under ex parte review).
13 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005).
14 See ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 99.
15 United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/mission.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
16 Id.; International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 95-
223, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified as amended in USA PATRIOT Act).
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the President the authority to freeze the assets of an individual or
organization designated a national security threat which had its source in
whole or in substantial part outside the United States only if the government
had declared a national emergency.17
Under IEEPA, once the President designates an individual or entity a
threat, he must report it within ten days to OFAC. OFAC then places the
individual or organization on its Specially Designated Terrorist List and
informs banks or other financial institutions to freeze any assets they may
hold on behalf of this individual or organization.1 8 A bank's refusal to
comply may result in criminal or civil penalties. 19  Although Congress
originally enacted IEEPA to limit the President's power during peacetime,
the President's decisions have undergone little scrutiny from the courts.2°
After the 1998 East Africa bombings, the Clinton Administration
added Osama bin Laden and several of his associates to OFAC's Specially
Designated Terrorist List.2 1 However, prior to the 1990s OFAC had only
frozen funds associated with Libya and Cuba, and had just begun to
transition toward the handling of non-state activities.22 This may explain
why OFAC froze few funds related to non-state actor terrorism prior to
9/11.23 The 9/11 Commission Financing Monograph observed that this
restraint might be attributed to OFAC's reluctance to rely on shaky
classified intelligence,24 but it may also have been a result of the fact that al
Qaeda money flowed through an informal network of hawalas25 and Islamic
institutions, which were not linked to the traditional U.S. financial system.
26
17 Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-02(a)(1) (2000), amended by 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 2005).
18 Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States,
27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 352 (2006).
19 USA PATRIOT Act § 1705 (2000).
20 Donohue, supra note 18, at 352; see also Milena Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Newcomb, 995
F.2d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that OFAC acted reasonably under the APA and
under executive orders to seize Yugoslavian assets when it detained four vessels owned and
operated by subsidiaries of a Montenegrin company in which the Yugoslavian government
had a residual interest); Havana Club Holding v. Galleon, 961 F. Supp. 498, 503 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (holding that OFAC's decision to license a Cuban company's trademark was
unreviewable by the court because judicial review is precluded by "foreign policy
considerations and judgments of the Executive Branch that should not be disturbed by the
courts" or the APA).
21 Exec. Order No. 13,099, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1998), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. I
2001).
22 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 37.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 A hawala is an informal money remittance agency. Id. at 68. A hawala is different
from a formal money remittance agency because instead of using the formal financial system
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In 1999, the President placed the Taliban on the Specially Designated
Terrorist List.27  The Taliban, which then headed Afghanistan's official
government, proved an easy target for OFAC to penalize; OFAC blocked
more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks.28 Ironically,
under the pre-9/11 Bush Administration, former Secretary of the Treasury
Paul O'Neill attempted to quash the National Security Council's proposed
terrorist asset tracking center, announcing that he would reduce the U.S.
regulatory regime and depend on international cooperation to stem illicit
money flows.
29
Of course, 9/11 produced the opposite result, due to the enactment of
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act).30 The
USA PATRIOT Act expanded several executive powers under IEEPA.3"
The USA PATRIOT Act amended IEEPA to allow the executive branch to
submit classified evidence in camera and ex parte in court proceedings
against alleged financiers of terrorism; to allow OFAC to block assets
during the pendency, rather than after the conclusion, of an investigation;
and to allow the President to confiscate any property subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States of any foreign person, organization, or
country he determines planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in terrorist
hostilities or attacks against the United States.32
Although keeping all of these amendments in mind is important in
order to appreciate the extreme expansion of executive power that took
place, this Comment will focus on the civil liberties implications and
effectiveness of the second amendment, which expanded OFAC's ability to
freeze assets before a complete investigation of an individual's or
organization's involvement in terrorist financing. The Comment will then
to remit money, it does not use a negotiable instrument or other commonly recognized
method for the exchange of money. Id. Hawalas employ several methods to remit money,
such as settling preexisting debt, paying or receiving money from third party accounts,
importing or exporting both legal and illegal goods, and physically moving currency or
precious metals or stones. Id.
26 id.
27 Exec. Order No. 13,129, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1999), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. I
2001).
28 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 38.
29 Stephen Fidler & Haig Simonian, IMF Chief Urges United Response to Slowdown,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 6, 2001, at Fight Against Terror Economy 4.
30 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
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propose several steps that may be taken so as to mitigate the government's
infringement on civil liberties, including imposing a minimum evidentiary
standard that must be satisfied prior to a freezing action and corresponding
reporting requirements.
III. OFAC'S LACK OF A CLEAR EVIDENTIARY STANDARD HAS RESULTED
IN UNFAIRLY TARGETING SEVERAL U.S. ORGANIZATIONS
OFAC's ability to freeze assets during the pendency of an
investigation has the potential effect of shutting down an entity indefinitely,
without the more fully developed administrative record necessary for an
IEEPA designation according to IEEPA's pre-9/1 1 evidentiary standards.33
OFAC can and has frozen assets based on remarkably little evidence.
OFAC does not collect its own intelligence; rather, it relies on the
intelligence community to collect and often analyze the evidence, which it
then uses to make designations.34 Recent cases have involved the shutdown
of organizations based on hearsay, newspaper articles, and unsubstantiated
intelligence.
Not surprisingly, the lack of an evidentiary threshold has resulted in
OFAC mistakenly freezing assets of entities that the United States later
found had no direct link to terrorists. In addition, no amount of freezing has
led the U.S. government to secure a single terrorist-related conviction.
36
This Part will analyze the effects of the lack of a clear evidentiary standard
by evaluating several recent problematic OFAC freezes: (1) the al Barakaat
money remittance case, (2) Islamic charities, and (3) the case of Enaam
Amaout.
A. THE CASE OF AL BARAKAAT
The government committed its biggest gaffe when OFAC froze the
assets of numerous U.S. and overseas branches of the al Barakaat money
remittance agency. The 9/11 Commission Financing Monograph stated that
OFAC acted hastily in freezing al Barakaat's money shortly after the 9/11
attacks in order to "show the world community and [U.S.] allies that the
United States was serious about pursuing the financial targets. 37 Upon
further investigation of al Barakaat, OFAC found no evidence of the direct
link to bin Laden that it had previously suspected.38
33 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 8.
34 Id. at 37.
31 See id. at 79, 82, 85,99, 104,111, 113.
36 Id. at 113.
31 Id. at 79.
38 Id. at 82-83.
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Al Barakaat was a money remittance agency used by the Somalian
community in the United States and in other parts of the world to remit
earnings to relatives in Somalia.39 The al Barakaat network played a major
role in supporting Somalia's economy because Somalia had no banking
system or central bank and, therefore, al Barakaat was the sole entity
through which foreign exchange could be made.4 ° In addition, al Barakaat
was the largest business group in Somalia, with subsidiaries also involved
in telecommunications and construction.4'
Prior to 9/11, al Barakaat attracted some money laundering suspicion
by the FBI based on the large amounts of money it funneled from the
United States to Somalia via a single account in the United Arab Emirates.
However, the FBI was never able to develop enough evidence against al
Barakaat to press criminal charges, largely because it obtained most of its
information from uncorroborated sources within the American Somali
community.43 Intelligence officials could not rely on much of this
information because they considered many of these tips to be rumors started
by political and business rivals within the community.44
After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the
White House's and Treasury Department officials' intense pressure on
OFAC to "show results" resulted in designating and freezing the assets of
entities based on weak evidentiary foundations.45 In fact, the intelligence
community's evidence often consisted only of data "linking" entities and
individuals to terrorist groups "primarily through common acquaintances,
group affiliations, historic relationships, phone communications, and other
such contacts.",46 However, as the 9/11 Commission Financing Monograph
observed, "It proved far more difficult to actually trace the money from a
suspected entity or individual to the terrorist group, or to otherwise show
complicity, as required in defending the designations in court.,47 A source
described the post-9/11 approach to freezing as "so forward leaning we
almost fell on our face."4 8 Some believed the government's hasty approach
'9 Id. at 67.
40 Id.
41 id.
42 Id. at 98.
41 Id. at 75.
44 IBRAHIM WARDE, THE PRICE OF FEAR: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE FINANCIAL WAR ON
TERROR 98 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2007).
45 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 79.
46 Id. at 47.
47 Id. (emphasis added).
48 Id. at 79.
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to cracking down on terrorist finance would result in a high level of false
designations, which proved to be true in the case of al Barakaat.49
In this case, the government's haste certainly made waste. In
developing evidentiary support for the freezing of al Barakaat's assets:
The [OFAC] analysts were told that they did not need to have evidence that each al-
Barakaat entity took part in terrorist financing; it was sufficient to show only that the
main entity itself was involved to be able to close all of the branches and freeze all of
the money. Thus, the analysts needed only to refer to the seized telephone lists or a
commercial index of businesses such as Dun & Bradstreet to justify the closing of
each al-Barakaat branch office.
50
In addition, despite OFAC analysts' requests to continue investigations for
sixty to ninety days prior to freezing, "the OFAC management, apparently
reacting to external demands, told them they could not have it,"51 which
resulted in the immediate freezing of al Barakaat's assets. This pace
continued as the executive branch set aggressive goals of making a major
designation every four weeks, followed by derivative designations
throughout each month.52 Treasury officials have admitted that this
pressure resulted in weak evidentiary foundations in freezing actions.53
After al Barakaat's designation, U.S. investigators traveled to the
United Arab Emirates on two separate occasions to review al Barakaat bank
records to establish support for its claim that the entity was engaged in
terrorism funding activities.54 Despite incredible cooperation on the part of
the United Arab Emirates and access to "thousands of pages of documents
culled from ten accounts held by" al Barakaat, investigators "could find no
direct evidence at all of any real link between al-Barakaat and terrorism of
any type. 55 OFAC had frozen al Barakaat's assets based on the suspicion
that bin Laden was an early investor in al Barakaat and that al Barakaat had
diverted money to al Qaeda, but investigators were not able to substantiate
either claim.56
Furthermore, Secretary O'Neill had originally estimated that al
Barakaat had diverted $25 million per year to terrorist activities, but
investigators found that al Barakaat's profits totaled only about $700,000






14 Id. at 81-82.
" Id. at 81-83.
56 Id. at 83.
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skimmed. 57 This experience led one investigator to believe that "much of
the evidence [used by OFAC] for al-Barakaat's terrorist ties rested on
unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of domestic FBI sources, 5 8
perhaps the very sources that were earlier deemed rumors started by
political and business rivals.
From a policy perspective, the government likely chose this course
because it is much easier to penalize a rooted institution than a disparate,
mobile network of individual terrorists. The Bush Administration may have
found freezing al Barakaat's assets a convenient way to give the impression
of being tough on terror. Less than two months after the 9/11 attacks,
President Bush proclaimed that the freeze would "disrupt the murderers'
work ... interrupt[] al Qaeda's communications .... block[] an important
source of funds, [and] provide[] [the government] with valuable
information" 5 9 Incredibly, the Bush Administration has continued to hold
this view despite the FBI's conclusion that there was no direct link between
al Barakaat and bin Laden or al Qaeda, and despite the 9/11 Commission's
60criticisms.
B. ISLAMIC CHARITIES
The al Barakaat case is not the only situation in which OFAC froze an
entity's assets based on questionable evidence. Many mainstream Islamic
charities have also been easy targets.6' Several of these charities have
brought cases against OFAC in court, but have had little success in
reversing freezing sanctions. However, the charities' inability to obtain
relief has not been based on proof of guilt, but rather the great procedural
difficulties in reviewing OFAC's actions.
OFAC is not required to show any evidence of a suspect's intent to
support or knowledge of support for terrorism when an individual or entity
57 id.
58 Id. at 82.
'9 Global Security.Org, News from the Washington File (Nov. 7, 2001),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/ 11/mil-Ol 1107-usia 12.htm.
60 WARDE, supra note 44, at 102.
61 Charitable giving, or the tradition of zakat, is one of the five pillars of faith in Islam
and consequently a religious obligation. Laila AI-Marayati, American Muslim Charities:
Easy Targets in the War on Terror, 25 PACE L. REv. 321, 321-22 (2005). Many Muslims
choose to donate money to American Muslim charities to fulfill this obligation. Id. at 322.
Despite the government's inability to establish a "money trail" between financing terrorism
and these charities, a "cloud of suspicion continues to grow despite modest efforts on the
part of the Treasury Department... to convince the community otherwise." Id. at 329.
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appeals the freezing of assets to a court.62 Furthermore, the government can
introduce secret evidence that can only be viewed ex parte and in camera,63
and OFAC's decisions are twice-protected, both by high deference to
agency decisions through the APA and by extremely high deference to the
Executive's national security and foreign relations decisions.64
Accordingly, courts have routinely dismissed all challenges to OFAC's
freezing decisions with regard to Islamic charities without analyzing the
fairness or public policy implications of such actions.65
In a recent case, the government failed to successfully prosecute the
leaders of an entity OFAC had sanctioned, in large part because there was
little evidentiary support. The government alleged that the largest U.S.-
based Islamic charity, the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), financially
supported the Hamas terrorist organization. The government attempted to
establish that HLF indirectly funded Hamas by funding Islamic "charitable
groups" called "zakat committees, which build hospitals and feed the
poor,, 66 alleging that these committees were controlled by Hamas and
facilitated Hamas's goals of "spread[ing] its ideology and recruit[ing]
supporters" to its terrorist cause.67 Despite the government's years of
investigation and preparation for the trial, the jury did not convict any of the
HLF leaders and acquitted one of the five defendants on all but one
charge.68 A mistrial was declared for the other defendants after the jury
reported after nineteen days that it could not continue deliberations.69
After the trial, one juror told the Associated Press that "[t]here was so
little evidence" that the case "was strung together with macaroni noodles"
and that the government should not retry the case. 70  David Cole, a
professor of constitutional law at Georgetown University, also criticized
OFAC's lack of evidentiary support for decisions to freeze charities' assets,
62 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005).
63 Id. § 1702(c).
64 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
65 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 92 (2007); Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d
748 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003).
66 Leslie Eaton, U.S. Prosecution of Muslim Group Ends in Mistrial: A Jury Is








stating that the HLF jury verdict "suggests the government is really pushing
beyond where the law justifies them going., 71 Finally, Matthew D. Orwig,
a partner at Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP and former U.S. Attorney
for the Eastern District of Texas, deemed the verdict "a stunning setback for
the government.
72
Perhaps the government's biggest mistake was introducing faulty
evidence, including transcripts that incorrectly translated quotations from
HLF officials.73 These transcripts included supposed anti-Semitic remarks
that were not actually reflective of the HLF executive director's speech, and
declarations by another HLF member allegedly showing his support for
Hamas when he was actually denying such support.74 The government
tacitly conceded the errors when United States Attorney Richard B. Roper
argued that "the government's case came from thousands of intercepts and
surveillance transcripts and it would be unfair to throw out the case based
on a couple of transcript errors. 75
In another case, Islamic American ReliefAgency v. Gonzales, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of OFAC's freezing action against a
U.S. charity and recipient of grants from the U.S. Agency for International
Development,76 the Islamic American Relief Agency, based on the
government's theory that it is the "same organization" as the Islamic
African Relief Agency in Sudan, an alleged financier of terrorist activities.77
The court applied the APA's "highly deferential standard of review" that
requires the court to rule in favor of OFAC as long as OFAC's actions were
not "arbitrary and capricious" and were based on "substantial evidence.,
78
After reviewing the government's evidence in support of the
designation, the court noted, "We acknowledge that the unclassified record
evidence is not overwhelming, but we reiterate that our review-in an area
at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative
law-is extremely deferential. 79  The court, thus, deemed the evidence
"sufficient" to support OFAC's freezing based on such deference. 80
71 Eaton, supra note 66.
72 Id.
73 Shawn Zeller, Islamic Charities Await Their Day in Court, CQ WEEKLY (D.C.), May
25, 2007, at 1573.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Dave Helling, Hulshofs Campaign Says Money from Donor Facing Terror Charges
Was Handled Properly, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 12, 2008, at B6.
77 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
78 Id. at 732 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
79 Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
80 Id.
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Since this ruling, a federal grand jury has indicted the Islamic
American Relief Agency on charges of sending money to an orphanage in
Pakistan owned by an Afghan mujahideen leader; and included in the
indictment charges of money laundering, conspiracy, and obstruction of
justice in the indictment against former U.S. Congressman Mark
Siljander.81 The government charged Siljander based on his representation
of the Islamic American Relief Agency in a lobbying campaign to protest
its OFAC designation. 82 The trial will take place in 200983 and will reveal
whether the government's case supported by evidence used by OFAC in its
freezing action will fare any better than the Holy Land Foundation criminal
prosecution.
C. THE CASE OF ENAAM ARNAOUT
The government's case against the Chicago-based Benevolence
International Foundation's (BIF) founder Enaam Arnaout provides an
additional example of want of evidence. BIF was a tax-exempt
organization that originally provided support to the mujahideen fighting the
Soviets in Afghanistan and humanitarian aid to refugees of the war in
Afghanistan.84 BIF came under the scrutiny of the FBI in the early 1990s
when it allegedly began supporting jihad movements "outside of approved
channels. 85 However, despite intelligence gathered from surveillance and
from going through BIF's garbage, the FBI "believed they still could not
come close to proving a criminal case against Arnaout or BIF. ' 86 Shortly
after 9/I1, OFAC received word from the General Counsel of Treasury that
it needed to act against BIF immediately even though it "had not yet
developed the evidence necessary for a designation under IEEPA."' 7
Therefore, OFAC relied on the USA PATRIOT Act to freeze assets "during
the pendency of an investigation. ', 88
After freezing BIF's assets, the government attempted to develop a
criminal case against BIF and Arnaout based upon a copy of the meeting
minutes for the founding of al Qaeda and handwritten messages between
81 Mark Morris, Islamic Charity Faces New Charges, KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 17, 2008,
at Al.
82 Id.
83 The Associated Press, Siliander to Face Trial, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 23, 2008, at
A6.
84 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 94.
85 Id. at 94-95.
86 Id. at 97.




bin Laden and Arnaout, both obtained from the Bosnian branch of BIF.89
BIF's lawyers argued that this evidence dated from the 1980s and early
1990s, when the United States and bin Laden were aiding the Afghans in
their war against the Soviet Union.90 In fact, before the trial began, the
presiding U.S. District Judge, Suzanne B. Conlon, criticized the way that
the prosecutors had indicted Arnaout, noting in particular that they had
failed under the rules of evidence to show why many of the accusations
should be brought to a jury.91
Although the prosecution was able to get Arnaout to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of diverting funds to provide boots, blankets, and other goods
to militants in Bosnia and Chechnya, Judge Conlon observed that Arnaout's
alleged ties to al Qaeda were from a time "when [the United States] wasn't
necessarily opposed to bin Laden., 92 In handing down a lesser sentence
than that recommended for Arnaout by the government, the sentencing
judge also noted that the government had not proven:
[T]hat the Bosnian and Chechen recipients of BIF aid were engaged in a federal act of
terrorism .... Nor does the record reflect that he attempted, participated in, or
conspired to commit any act of terrorism .... The government failed to connect the
dots. 3
While the government may have won a small victory in this case, the court
was evidently uncomfortable with the evidentiary basis for OFAC's
targeting of Arnaout.
IV. OFAC SANCTIONS ARE PUNITIVE TOWARD AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS
AND ENTITIES
Several politicians and academics have made the argument that the
effect of freezing assets is a penalty akin to criminal punishment. A recent
journal article analyzes the U.N. sanctions regime, which the United States,
as a member of the U.N. Security Council, helped to create in response to
the bombings in East Africa and implemented through OFAC.94 The article
argues that:
89 WARDE, supra note 44, at 140.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 141.
92 John Mintz, Head of Muslim Charity Sentenced: Ill. Man Diverted Funds to Militants;
No Proof of Terror Link, Judge Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2003, at A2.
93 WARDE, supra note 44, at 141.
94 Andrew Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism
Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 203, 218 (2007); see Exec. Order
No. 13,129, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1999), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. I 2001); The Al-
Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Resolution 1267, http://www.un.org/sc/
committees/1267/information.shtml (last visited Dec. 8, 2008).
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[T]he nature and severity of the sanctions should bring the regime within the criminal
sphere. The sanctions are imposed on those adjudged to be involved in financing
terrorism, a serious criminal activity under both international and national law.
Moreover, the severity of the sanctions suggests a punitive element. Sanctions have
dire economic consequences because they deny an individual his or her livelihood and
remain in place indefinitely. Finally, there is the irreparable stigma of being labeled a
terrorist supporter.
9 5
The severity of the sanctions is also evident from the fact that the
freeze is applied to all of an individual's assets regardless of how much may
have been funneled toward terrorist causes. Further, the sanctions may
apply indefinitely.96
Sanctioned individuals have, in fact, experienced the effect of the
criminal penalties described above. In November 2001, a Minneapolis-
based money remitter who was part of the al Barakaat network was
designated, along with the al Barakaat entity, as a supporter of terrorism. 97
As a result, anyone in the United States was prohibited from engaging in
any financial transaction with him.98 Only after he filed suit against the
government did OFAC grant him a license to withdraw funds to make such
basic purchases as groceries.99
In the case of the al Barakaat network asset freeze, the government
effectively shut down the business. This closure, of course, put anyone
employed by the business out of work and even affected those who simply
used the business for remittance. Because al Barakaat was used by the
Somali community as a primary way to remit money to their family in
Somalia, the blocked money "represented [the loss of] their life savings and
an economic lifeline to an impoverished country."' 00 Somali nationals also
would have felt the effect, because at this time al Barakaat was the largest
business group in the country.' 0'
Not only does an actual freeze punish an entity, but the threat of a
freeze, or mere suspicion that an entity may have its assets frozen, creates
punitive effects. The government has subjected KinderUSA, a U.S. charity
that provides humanitarian aid to children in war zones that include
Palestine, to surveillance since at least 2004, but has never designated the
95 Hudson, supra note 94, at 218 (footnote omitted).
96 See Peter Gutherie, Note, Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491, 505 (2004).
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charity a financier of terrorism. 10 2 However, the effects of surveillance
alone have caused the same defamatory effects that accompany actual asset
freezing. Matthew Levitt recently published a book, Hamas: Politics,
Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, which alleges that
KinderUSA funds Hamas. 10 3 KinderUSA responded by filing a libel suit,
complaining that the book's allegations have damaged "its ability to raise
funds and to recruit and retain volunteers for its charitable mission, and
caused irreparable harm to its reputation.'1
0 4
The President has also recently increased penalties for violations of
economic sanctions against designated terrorist organizations when he
signed significant amendments to IEEPA into law. 10 5 In addition, the
punitive effects are virtually irreversible because OFAC's freezing actions
are essentially non-reviewable. A decision by OFAC to freeze assets is
doubly damning: not only can it base its designation on "less evidence than
is required in a criminal or even civil trial," if an entity appeals OFAC's
action to any court, OFAC is protected by the triple threat of the APA,
extremely high deference to executive actions regarding foreign policy, and
extremely high deference to executive actions regarding national security.
If this is not enough to dissuade a party to challenge an OFAC freezing
action, the affected party is also barred from reviewing the evidence on
which OFAC has based its freezing action, which, not knowing OFAC's
exact allegations, eliminates any possibility of rebutting the designation.
In addition, although the effects of an OFAC sanction are similar to
forfeiture, a designated person or entity does not have the same rights
available in a civil forfeiture action. In seizures unrelated to OFAC, the
government must file a lawsuit and bear the burden of proof by a
preponderance of evidence. 0 6 When OFAC freezes a person's or entity's
assets, it may do so based merely on suspicion of terrorism financing or
pending an investigation, 0 7 which imposes little, if any, burden of proof on
the government and certainly no requirement to file a lawsuit before a court.
102 Muslim Charity Files Libel Suit over Allegations of Terrorist Ties, OMB WATCH,
May 15, 2007, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3829/1/84/?TopicID=2.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 95-
223, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified as amended in USA PATRIOT Act); Congress Misses
Oversight Opportunity on Charities and Anti-Terrorist Financing Laws, OMB WATCH, Oct.
10, 2007, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/4042/l/84/?TopiclD=2.
106 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 50.
107 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005).
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A person subject to civil forfeiture is also better protected than
someone subject to an OFAC freeze because the owner of the property has
a right to conduct discovery of the government's evidence and to avoid
forfeiture by demonstrating that she had no knowledge of the illegal
character of the property. 10 8 In OFAC freeze cases, the owner does not
have the right to review the government's evidence either through an
administrative process or when challenging the designation before a
court. 109 In addition, since there is no intent requirement for charges of
terrorism financing, a designee has no right to the defense that his or its
transactions were not intended for that purpose.' 10
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OFAC's CURRENT FREEZING PROCESS IS
QUESTIONABLE
Notwithstanding the OFAC freezing process's civil liberties
infringements, OFAC's heavy-handed approach to terrorist finance has
produced questionable results. It is often unclear, even according to OFAC,
how effective the freezing process is. In a 2006 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report on the effectiveness of current counter-terrorism-financing
activities, OFAC admitted that its reliance on "totaling an amount of
blocked assets at the end of the year" in its annual report to Congress to
show its "progress" in deterring terrorist finance did not actually measure
the effectiveness of its efforts.11' In fact, effectiveness may not be
measurable at all, as Treasury officials have responded to GAO criticism by
noting that measuring the deterrent value of its sanctions program "is
problematic, in part because the direct impact on unlawful activity is
unknown and because precise metrics for illegal and clandestine activities
are hard to develop.""'
Even if OFAC freezes successfully deter some funds from reaching
terrorists, the impact on preventing terrorism generally may be negligible.
The cost of preparation for the attacks on the World Trade Center, including
pilot-training and travel expenses, was reportedly no more than $500,000."'
The staff of the 9/11 Commission also reported that the funds al Qaeda used
for the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings were held in an informal
108 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 50-51.
109 See id. at 50.
110 Donohue, supra note 18, at 307.
111 U.S. GEN. ACCOUYNTING OFFICE, GAO-06-632T, TERRORIST FINANCING: AGENCIES
CAN IMPROVE EFFORTS TO DELIVER COUNTER-TERRORISM-FINANCING TRAINING AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ABROAD 19 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
112 id.
113 Andrew Anthony, The Price of Peace, OBSERVER (London), Mar. 6, 2005, at 20.
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network of hawalas and Islamic institutions located outside the United
States.1 4 OFAC only has jurisdiction over U.S. individuals and entities,
which provides it with an extremely limited enforcement arena.
1 15
Nevertheless, OFAC reported in 2004 that it had frozen $3.9 million in al
Qaeda assets.116 Although it is not clear how OFAC identified these assets
as al Qaeda's, these monies are likely comprised largely of the assets of the
Islamic charities discussed in Part III.
Finally, a central component of the fight against terror is international
cooperation, particularly in light of jurisdictional limits on OFAC. When
OFAC is unable to freeze the assets of an entity outside its jurisdiction, it
often relies on the institutional framework of the United Nations to extend
its reach.1 7 The U.N. Security Council has a Sanctions Committee that
oversees state implementation of measures against terrorist financing." 8
The Sanctions Committee maintains a list, similar to OFAC's, of
"individuals and entities designated as being associated with [O]sama bin
Laden." ' 19  Security Council Resolution 1333 requires state parties to
enforce freezing procedures against designated entities and imposes
penalties on those who violate the asset freeze. 120  The majority of the
individuals on the Sanctions List were placed there by the Sanctions
Committee as a result of recommendations by the United States.12' The
United States' guiding role in this process suggests that the United States
relies heavily on the international community to fight global terrorism
financing.
However, the international community is concerned by the methods by
which OFAC freezes assets. 122 These concerns began to arise as early as
the al Barakaat designation. Based on U.S. intelligence regarding al
Barakaat, the U.N. Sanctions Committee added three Swedish citizens
employed with the Swedish branch of al Barakaat to its list.' 23 European
Commission regulations require E.U. members to freeze the assets of listed
114 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 37.
115 Id.
116 GAO REPORT, supra note 111, at 21.
117 Gutherie, supra note 96, at 498 n.35.
118 Id. at 493-94.
119 S.C. Res. 1333, 16(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).
120 Id. 17-18.
121 See Per Cramr, Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted U.N. Sanctions: The
Erosion of Trust in the Security Council, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER
STATES 85, 88 (Erika de Wet & Andr6 Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
122 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 48, 84.
123 Case T-306/01, Aden v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. 11-02387, 24.
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individuals and entities. 124 As a result, Sweden, an E.U. member, froze the
assets of the three men and of al Barakaat without notice.
12 5
One of the men, Mr. Aden, discovered the action when he awoke to
find reporters camped outside his apartment; they followed him to withdraw
money from an ATM that would not allow him any access to its services.
1 6
Mr. Aden and his lawyer appealed their case to the Swedish government,
presenting a "thick stack of business records," which the government
deemed to present no sign of any link to terrorism or any other
impropriety.
1 27
After the Swedish government learned that the U.N. had received its
target list from the United States, Sweden asked the U.S. Treasury to
provide it with the evidence it had used to determine that its citizens' assets
should be blocked.128 The United States sent a packet of information that
consisted almost entirely of news articles regarding al Barakaat, a statement
by President Bush on al Qaeda, and a briefing transcript by then-Secretary
of State Colin Powell.129 The only mention of Mr. Aden and his colleagues
was in a flowchart of al Barakaat's structure.
130
The Swedish government was finally able to convince the United
States to remove Mr. Aden and one of his colleagues from the list after a
series of diplomatic negotiations.1 3' It is unclear why the third individual,
Youssef Ali, was not also removed from the list, but it may be because Ali
refused to resign from the defunct al Barakaat despite his two colleagues
having done so. 132 Mr. Ali has said, "Show me the evidence that what I did
was wrong and I will resign. Without the evidence, I cannot do it."
133
The public reaction to this situation was a "general feeling that the
three had been in effect convicted of a crime without due process and that
injustice had been done." 134 This was particularly so because the sanctions
regime lacked an appeals or review mechanism. 135  In addition to
advocating on behalf of its citizens, Sweden requested that the Sanctions
124 Commission Regulation 2199/2001, art. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 295).
125 Christopher Cooper, Shunned in Sweden: How Drive to Block Funds for Terrorism
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Committee review the list in its entirety, but this request was denied. 136 The
Swedish government further suggested that the Sanctions Committee adopt
a criminal evidentiary standard in evaluating which entities to block, but the
Sanctions Committee also rejected this suggestion. 137
Finally, five years after Ali was included in the U.N. Sanctions
Committee List, the Swedish government was able convince the United
States to de-list him.138 Regarding this situation, Swedish State Secretary
for Foreign Affairs Hans Dahlgren commented that "[w]hat has happened
illustrates that the [U.N.] sanctions need reform, that better legal security is
needed in the system and that it must become easier to remove individuals
from the sanctions list who obviously do not belong there.' 39 It is unclear
how many other people on the list also fall into this category.
France has also expressed concerns about the current sanctions
process. Emanuel Lenin, a French U.N. Diplomat, has stated, "For the first
time in the history of the U.N., we are using a system of punishment against
people who don't have a clear link to a [rogue] country .... We need to
adopt clear criteria to make sure we're not targeting innocent people.1 4 °
Although never explicitly stated, these protests against the current
system may be considered a criticism of the U.S. system, as most of the
persons and entities listed are submitted by the United States. Furthermore,
the Sanctions Committee is composed only of members of the U.N.
Security Council.' 4' Since the United States is on the Security Council, it is
likely that the United States may also be behind the reluctance to de-list
individuals such as Mr. Ali, despite lack of a clear evidentiary basis for his
inclusion on the list.
These protests are not limited to this particular case. Five cases
challenging the validity of this system have been raised before the European
Court of Justice as well as several legal challenges in national courts in
Europe, North America, Turkey, and Pakistan. 42  The U.N. Analytical
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team has reported that:
136 id.
137 Donohue, supra note 18, at 420.
138 Sweden: Ahmed Yusuf May Be Deleted from UN Sanctions List, U.S. FED. NEWS,
Aug. 17, 2006, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1 P3-1097160631 .html.
M3 Id.
140 Cooper, supra note 125.
141 Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work at 2 (Nov. 7, 2002, as
amended on Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/comnmittees/1267/1267-
guidelines.pdf.
142 Watson Inst. for Int'l Studies, Watson Inst. Targeted Sanctions Project, Annex to the
letter dated 19 May 2006 from the Permanent Representatives of Germany, Sweden and
Switzerland to the United Nations: Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and
Clear Procedures (Mar. 30, 2006), 9, U.N. Doc. S/2006/331.
1458 [Vol. 98
2008] CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING
Some Member States [of the U.N.] have indicated an increasing reluctance to add
names to the lists of individuals and entities targeted by Security Council sanctions
because of ... concerns [regarding unfairness in the application of targeted sanctions].
More than fifty Member States have expressed concerns about the lack of due process
and absence of transparency associated with listing and delisting.1
43
Perhaps the central issue that creates concern among the public is that the
targeted sanctions often have the effect of criminal penalties, but these
people are not protected by the same standards of evidence, burdens of
proof, and access to remedies of legal processes under the U.N. regime.'44
These protests have not gone unheeded. The European Court of
Justice (ECJ) ruled on September 3, 2008 that the E.U.'s application of
U.N. sanctions against a Saudi Arabian businessman and the Swedish
branch of al Barakaat infringed their basic rights and was, therefore, illegal
under E.U. law in Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International
Foundation v. Council and Commission.145  This ruling is particularly
groundbreaking as the ECJ overturned the lower court's decision that it did
not have the jurisdiction to review the Council of the European Union (EC)
regulations implementing the U.N. sanctions regime's alleged violations of
the petitioners' fundamental rights. 146  The U.N. sanctions regime was
promulgated under the U.N. Security Council's emergency Chapter VII
powers, which has historically meant that member states are obligated to
comply with such resolutions without a right to review.1
47
Despite these jurisdictional limitations, the ECJ annulled the EC
regulation implementing the sanctions regime and challenged by Yadi and
al Barakaat, because the regulation violated the petitioners' "right to
defence, in particular the right to be heard, and of the right to effective
judicial review."1 48 The ECJ found of central importance to the petitioners'
violation of their right to defense the European Council's failure to inform
the petitioners of the evidence used against them to justify their inclusion
on the U.N. sanctions list and its failure to afford them the right to be
143 Id. (citing Third and Fourth Reports of the 1267 Monitoring Teams).
'44 Id. at 10.
145 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 (Sept. 3, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/
cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=-rechercher&numaff-C-402/05.
146 Case T-306/1, Yusuf v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3533. The lower
court did qualify its lack of power of judicial review to lack of power to review under the
laws of the European Community, but not under jus cogens. Id. 277. The court held that
the U.N. sanctions regulations did not violate jus cogens based on the ability of sanctioned
persons and entities to petition their governments to request their removal from the sanctions
list. Id. 307, 309, 312.
147 See Michael Matheson, ICJ Review of Security Council Decisions, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT'L. L. REv. 615, 622-23 (2004).
148 Kadi andAl Barakaat, C-402/05 P & C-415/05, 334.
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informed of that evidence within a reasonable period after those measures
were enacted. 49 The ECJ, however, afforded the EC the opportunity to
remedy the current regulation's lack of due process by permitting the
effects of the regulation to be maintained for three months subject to
remedy of the infringements.150 Nevertheless, if the EC does not satisfy the
ECJ's requirements, the U.N. sanctions regime could collapse.' 5 ' It is not
clear at this stage what steps the EC or the U.N. has taken to remedy this
situation. What is clear is that this case is in stark contrast to the rulings of
U.S. courts regarding violation of due process rights of sanctioned
individuals and entities. While U.S. courts may continue routinely to
dismiss due process challenges to OFAC freezing actions, a potential lack
of continued international cooperation is a stimulus for the United States to
reevaluate its evidentiary standards.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE OFAC FREEZING
PROCESS
Despite the concerns raised in this Comment, OFAC sanctions are the
best immediate option for stopping and deterring individuals and entities
from financing terrorism. However, as this Comment has shown, it is
questionable whether many of OFAC's most recent targets actually are
guilty of this crime. The fact that OFAC can freeze assets before the
government has actually made this determination is particularly troubling
because the effects of asset freezing are so severe and the process of un-
freezing can take years. Although no U.S. court has ruled that this
procedure is a violation of the right to property, the indefinite freezing of an
individual's assets without any finding of guilt certainly appears to be a de
facto violation.
Concerns of this nature have fueled reforms of the U.N. sanctions
procedures, but in the United States OFAC's approach to terrorism finance
has consistently been lauded by Democratic and Republican politicians
alike. 152 In addition, U.S. courts have consistently deferred to its authority
despite stated reservations about the quality of evidence used when
blocking assets. 53 Why should the government care about the collateral
149 Id. 348.
]so Id. 375-76.
151 Richard Barrett, Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Threatened, 2008 POLICY WATCH
1409 (The Wash. Inst. for Near E. Pol'y, Washington D.C.), Oct. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2935.
152 Drake Bennett, Small Change-Why We Can't Fight Terrorists by Cutting Off Their
Money, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2008, at K1.
153 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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costs of OFAC's actions if the Judiciary and other independent monitors of
OFAC approve of its actions?
The government should be concerned because of the precedents set by
OFAC's actions. The executive branch has delegated to OFAC the power
to essentially confiscate assets of an individual or entity with as little
evidence as newspaper clippings and Dun & Bradstreet listings, as
demonstrated in the case of al Barakaat.1 54 OFAC has at times used this
power imprudently and created a widespread perception, in the United
States and overseas, of discriminatory treatment of Muslim charities. 
15
Shutting down these charities has also dried up funding for numerous
legitimate relief efforts abroad without ever resulting in a single conviction
for financing terrorism.
Unfortunately, U.S. courts have not considered any of the policy
implications of OFAC's actions because of its extreme deference to
executive actions. Furthermore, Congress has amplified the Executive's
current powers through the USA PATRIOT Act and IEEPA, so no
argument can be made that the President is acting "in a zone of twilight.
156
Congress currently seems most concerned with verifying that OFAC's
blocking actions are actually effective in countering terrorism financing by
demanding better quantitative and qualitative measures for assessing
OFAC's efforts.
157
But Congress should especially take note of the effect of OFAC's
actions on civil liberties. In the face of the expansion of executive power to
combat the war on terror, it is particularly important for Congress to also
focus its attention on safeguarding civil liberties, especially in light of past
excesses during wartime. OFAC sanctions tend to fly below the radar when
competing for attention with abuses at Abu Ghraib, debates over whether
water-boarding is actually torture, and discussions regarding the possible
closure of Guantanamo Bay. In light of these other pressing policy
concerns, OFAC has largely escaped the media scrutiny and public policy
discussion it merits.
However, non-profit organizations, such as OMB Watch, and several
academics have been monitoring OFAC and its missteps. OMB Watch
recently published a report called Muslim Charities and the War on Terror
154 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 79.
155 Shukri Abu Baker, former CEO of Holy Land Foundation has stated, "It's open
season on American Muslims in this country" based on suspicions that the FBI "falsified
evidence and fabricated a case, against the organization." Eric Lichtblau, Islamic Charity
Says F.B.I. Falsified Evidence Against It, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at A12.
156 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
157 GAO REPORT, supra note 111, at 21.
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that lists ten concerns regarding the effectiveness and civil liberty
implications of OFAC's actions. 158  The report highlights many of the
issues already addressed in this Comment and further expands on some of
these concerns:
(1) Drastic sanctions in anti-terrorist financing laws are being used to shut down entire
organizations, resulting in the loss of badly needed humanitarian assistance around the
world and creating a climate of fear in the nonprofit sector.
(2) Despite sweeping post-9/l1 investigative powers, authorities have failed to
produce significant evidence of terror financing by U.S.-based charities.
(3) Questionable evidence has been used to shut down the largest U.S.-based Muslim
charities.
(4) Anti-terrorist financing policies deny charities fundamental due process.
(5) There are no safe harbor procedures to protect charities acting in good faith or to
eliminate the risk of giving to Muslim charities or charitable programs working with
Muslim populations.
(6) Government action has created the perception of ethnic profiling and negatively
impacted Muslim giving.
(7) Organizations and individuals suspected of supporting terrorism are guilty until
proven innocent.
(8) Charitable funds have been withheld from people in need of assistance and
diverted to help pay judgments in unrelated lawsuits, violating the intentions of
innocent Muslim donors.
(9) There is unequal enforcement of anti-terrorist financing laws.
(10) Treatment of Muslim charities hurts, not helps, the war on terrorism. 159
So what can Congress do to reign in these excesses? Congress should
(1) require OFAC to meet a clear minimum evidentiary standard prior to
freezing a person's or entity's assets, and (2) report to Congress on its
compliance with this standard in conjunction with current reporting on the
effectiveness of sanctions.
With regard to developing a clear minimum evidentiary standard,
Congress should take note of recent U.N. Security Council efforts to reform
its evidentiary criteria and sanctions program in evaluating OFAC's current
criteria. Several U.N. member states commissioned a report by the Watson
158 OMB WATCH, MUSLIM CHARITIES AND THE WAR ON TERROR: TOP TEN CONCERNS AND
STATUS UPDATE (Kay Guinane ed., Feb. 2006), available at http://www.ombwatch.org
/pdfs/muslim-charities.pdf.
159 Id. at 2.
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Institute for International Studies of Brown University to "analyze current
sanctions committee practices and recommend proposals to strengthen
United Nations targeted sanctions procedures."'160  With regard to its
evidentiary standards analysis, the Watson Institute recommended that
"consistent norms and general standards for the content of statements of
case [used in proposing sanctions] be established to ensure that targeted
sanctions are applied to individuals and entities in a manner that is
nonarbitrary and impartial."' 
61
Consistent with the Watson Institute's recommendations, the first
requirement for OFAC's evidentiary standard should be OFAC's
compliance with a consistent and "nonarbitrary" standard when designating
an entity or individual for freezing sanctions. Allegations have arisen that
OFAC has targeted certain groups while giving other entities free passes.
In particular, OMB Watch has noted that OFAC turned a blind eye to
activities by Halliburton in Iran, a country that is an OFAC-listed state
sponsor of terrorism. 162 Although Halliburton was officially under
investigation by OFAC, the agency did not freeze its assets. 163 Instead
OFAC sent an inquiry to the company requesting "information with regard
to compliance.' 64 OFAC has also been known to work with Saudi charities
to help them restructure to avoid designation and freezing of assets.
65
Therefore, the new standard should prevent OFAC from applying
inconsistent treatment to entities that OFAC is considering sanctioning.
Second, if Congress continues to allow hearsay to be used as part of
the evidence for designation and as support for the designation in a court
hearing, it should be corroborated by additional substantial evidence. Even
in administrative proceedings, which allow "oral or documentary evidence,"
hearsay documentary evidence must be considered as part of the "whole
record... supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence."' 166 It may be difficult to define "substantial evidence"
when intelligence information can take so many different forms. However,
the corroborating evidence in the al Barakaat case-statements by President
Bush on al Qaeda, a transcript of a briefing led by Secretary of State Powell
160 U.N. GAOR & SCOR, Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit:
Identical Letters from the Permanent Rep. of Germany, Swed. and Switz. to the U.N.
Addressed to the President of the GAOR and the President of the SCOR, U.N. Doc.
A/60/887-S/2006/331 (May 19, 2006).
161 Watson Inst. for Int'l Studies, supra note 142, at 42.




166 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (d) (2006).
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and a Dun & Bradstreet report-would not meet the standard.167
Substantial corroborating evidence would provide specific support of the
activities alleged in the hearsay. This seems only reasonable in satisfying
the standard set forth in the APA that has protected OFAC's actions thus
far.168
Third, Congress should require that any evidence used in support of a
designation of possible support for al Qaeda is not based solely on an
alliance with Osama bin Laden during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. Although historical ties may create suspicion of current
support for terrorist activity, they are not dispositive of such support.
Furthermore, reliance solely on this type of evidence can later ruin
credibility in front of a judge, as seen in the BIF case. 169
Not only would these reforms better safeguard the liberties of those
who do not have any actual connection to terrorist activities, but they would
also add legitimacy to the counter-terrorist-financing process. In court,
prosecutors could present evidence of these evidentiary requirements to
create a presumption of legitimacy to the evidence used to convict
financiers of terrorism. Additionally, many of our allies, particularly those
in Europe, would be more likely to accept the entities the United States
proposes for listing without skepticism if they know OFAC has first met a
minimum evidentiary standard. Currently, Europe has chosen not to list a
number of the charities the United States has designated due to concerns
that "too broad an approach will affect innocent people or legitimate
political movements."
'1 70
Finally, Congress should impose reporting requirements on OFAC to
show that it is meeting its evidentiary standards. This will actually help
Congress to better evaluate the effectiveness of the sanctions. Effectiveness
cannot be measured simply by looking at the increase in the amount of
money frozen, which is Congress's current focus. 17 1 How much money
OFAC freezes does not matter if it is freezing assets that were not actually
used to fund terrorism. Evaluating whether OFAC has legitimately frozen
assets that would otherwise go to terrorist organizations could either
supplement its current reporting requirements or, more likely, help
Congress to better evaluate OFAC's progress.
Concerns over keeping the evidentiary standards secret are not merited
because OFAC's compliance could be reviewed by the House Permanent
167 ROTH ET AL., supra note 7, at 85; Cooper, supra note 125.
168 Administrative Procedure Act § 556 (d).
169 WARDE, supra note 44, at 140.
170 ANNE C. RICHARD, FIGHTING TERRORIST FINANCING: TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION
AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 36 (2005).
171 GAO REPORT, supra note 111, at 21.
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Select Committee on Intelligence, which is not authorized to disclose
classified information unless the President approves.'72 While OFAC
currently reports to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Committee on
Intelligence also oversees intelligence-related activities of the Treasury
Department, so a switch to its oversight of OFAC would not be outside its
expertise.173  Furthermore, all Members of the House, which naturally




In summary, Congress should take leadership in developing a more
effective freezing process because the courts' hands are tied by deference to
the APA and executive decisions regarding foreign policy and national
security. In addition, it is within Congress's authority, not the courts', to
develop evidentiary criteria for agencies to which it has delegated power. It
is Congress's job to provide a check on executive decision-making when
the courts cannot. Although OFAC is probably not currently acting outside
of its authority-as granted by IEEPA and the USA PATRIOT Act-in
freezing assets while entities or individuals are under investigation, it is
simply unconscionable for Congress to allow OFAC to freeze assets with
little more than suspicion as a basis. Although OFAC has a delisting
process for those who believe their funds have been wrongly blocked, this
process is not subject to independent review. It is essentially asking OFAC
to judge its own actions.
Congress can prevent OFAC from wrongfully freezing the assets of
persons or entities that are not directly linked to terrorist activities by
imposing a clear evidentiary standard and the reporting requirements
proposed above. The Executive's pressure on OFAC to "show results" and
its expansion of OFAC's freezing powers must be balanced against
oversight of the freezing process that only Congress can provide. The
above recommendations provide a framework for such oversight.
172 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE:
CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ALTERNATIVES, at CRS-4 (2007).
173 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, FAQs, http://intelligence.house.gov/
faqs.aspx (last visited Dec. 8, 2008).
174. Id.
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